Abstract. This paper studies how legal sanctions and enforcement affect brokers' conflicts of interest emanating from investment banking activities. We exploit the recent adoption of the Market Abuse Directive (MAD) across European countries and use the variation in legal sanctions and enforcement that exists in Europe to identify brokers' reaction. Overall, the enactment of MAD significantly reduced optimistic investment advice. This reduction is larger in countries equipped with more severe legal sanctions and in countries that strongly enforce the rules. Our analysis underscores the importance of legal sanctions and enforcement power to understand the real consequences of regulatory changes.
Introduction
Over the past decades, securities firms and their analysts have often been accused of producing overly optimistic research to attract and retain investment banking clients. Given the central role that analysts play in disseminating information across market participants and guiding investment decisions, regulatory agencies have taken corrective actions. As part of a large effort to better protect consumers and to restore trust in financial markets, several national regulators have designed new rules aiming to curb conflicted equity research and improve the overall quality of analysts' output (e.g., Mehran and Stulz, 2007 , for a survey). As with any new law the effectiveness of security regulations depends on how the new rules are designed, but also crucially on the associated legal sanctions and their practical enforcement (e.g., La Porta et al., 2006; Coffee, 2007; Jackson and Roe, 2009) . In a period characterized by unprecedented regulatory uncertainty, better understanding the real consequences of regulatory changes and the role played by sanctions and enforcement turns out to be of paramount importance.
To shed new light on this question, we examine how legal sanctions and enforcement power affect the nature and magnitude of the conflicts of interest emanating from brokers' investment banking activities. We do so by exploiting a recent regulatory change in the European Community (EC). In 2003, the European regulators decided to enact the Market Abuse Directive (MAD). Aiming to reorganize European financial markets, this regulation includes several provisions targeted to curb conflicts of interest in equity research. Similarly to U.S. rules (e.g., Kadan et al., 2009) , MAD limits the relationship between research and investment banking departments, and creates stringent disclosure requirements on the nature of such relationships (Directive 2003/125) . These changes in the European regulatory landscape allow us to provide novel evidence on the interplay between the severity of legal sanctions, enforcement and the behavior of financial analysts. Indeed, due to the absence of full legal harmonization across European countries, the enforcement of MAD's provisions and the sanctions in case of violations remain ultimately in the hands of national authorities. Hence, while the new rules apply equally in all Member States, the penalties and the actual enforcement vary across countries. We use this heterogeneity to empirically separate the role of sanctions and enforcement from the change in rules. In addition, while all EC Member States were required to adopt MAD, they did so at different points in time. Our empirical analysis proceeds in two steps. First, we evaluate the impact of the new European regulation on the extent of conflicted equity research. Second, we examine whether the observed changes in analysts' behavior depend on the severity of the associated legal sanctions and the strength with which regulators enforce new rules. To do so, we focus on the dynamics of stock recommendations issued by brokerage houses around the European regulatory change. To identify the presence of conflicts of interest, we rely on the exact provision of the European Directive that states that any recommendation made by (an analyst working for) a broker on a firm for which it has acted as underwriter or adviser over the last twelve months is considered as being exposed to conflicts of interest. We label these recommendations as affiliated. Across a large sample of recommendations made on stocks listed in thirteen European countries between 1997 and 2007 (261,260 recommendations), we document that affiliated brokers issued recommendations that were on average more optimistic than their peers in the pre-regulation period. While "Sell" and "Strong Sell" account for 18% of non-affiliated recommendations before MAD, they only represent 7% of the recommendations issued by affiliated brokers. Likewise, the proportion of "Buy" and "Strong Buy" is significantly larger for affiliated (60%) than for non-affiliated (46%). Similarly to what has been documented in the U.S., these descriptive results suggest that recommendations issued by affiliated brokers on European companies were tainted by conflicts of interest before the adoption of MAD. 1 We then show that the passage of the Directive has significantly mitigated the effect of conflicts of interest on equity research. After MAD, the distribution of recommendations issued by affiliated brokers is much less skewed towards favorable recommendations. The proportion of "Sell" and "Strong Sell" increases to 10%, while the proportion of "Buy" and "Strong Buy" decreases to 51%. In contrast, we observe virtually no change in the recommendations of non-affiliated brokers. 1 Note that the distribution of recommendations from affiliated brokers appears more balanced in Europe than in the U.S.
(e.g., Ertimur et al., 2006; Kadan et al., 2009). We confirm these patterns using a multivariate analysis that controls for various determinants of analysts' optimism. To measure the over-optimism bias of affiliated brokers, we focus on their relative recommendation, that is, the difference between their recommendation and the consensus recommendation. Across all countries, we estimate that the over-optimism bias of affiliated brokers almost vanishes following the adoption of MAD. Extensive robustness tests support this conclusion as well as the validity of our identification strategy. This first set of results indicates that the impact of the European Directive resembles that of the Regulation Fair Disclosure (RegFD) in 2000, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (section 501), and the Global Analyst Research Settlement in 2002 adopted earlier in the U.S. 2 Next, we exploit the unique cross-country dimension of our sample and estimate the effect of MAD on the over-optimism bias of affiliated brokers for each country separately. This analysis highlights two notable insights. First, in the pre-MAD period, the magnitude of the affiliated brokers' bias varies considerably across countries. For instance, while affiliated brokers exhibit almost no sign of over-optimism in Belgium, the affiliation bias appears particularly strong in Austria and the U.K.
Second, we observe an important heterogeneity in the mitigating impact of MAD among European countries. The reduction of the over-optimism bias of affiliated brokers ranges from 50% in Sweden to more than 100% in Portugal, where affiliated brokers became slightly (over-) pessimistic.
We find that this heterogeneity is related to the severity of the legal sanctions that are specifically applicable in cases of violations of MAD. In particular, we gather specific information on the potential sanctions brokers face in each country in cases of violations of MAD articles. For each country, we aggregate the relevant pecuniary administrative sanctions and criminal sanctions, including imprisonment and fines, to construct an index of sanction "severity" that goes along with the implementation of MAD. We document that the effect of MAD is significantly stronger in countries where MAD's sanctions are strong. After MAD, the over-optimism of affiliated brokers is virtually eliminated in countries equipped with severe sanctions (e.g. Ireland or France) but only decreased by 2 Mehran and Stulz (2007) survey the literature on conflicts of interest in the financial analysis industry and the effects of the U.S. reforms within the sell-side research industry. Recent research questions whether the conflicts have switched to the brokerage side (e.g., Chung and Teo, 2011). around 70% in the countries where sanctions are milder (e.g. Scandinavian countries). To alternatively measure the importance of legal sanctions, we use two other measures of sanctions severity. Notably, we find that the impact of MAD is stronger in countries where market supervisors are granted more power and in countries where criminal sanctions for financial misconduct are more severe.
We also uncover that the strength with which each country enforces its securities laws matters.
In sharp contrast with the U.S., the EC almost exclusively relies on public enforcement (e.g., La Porta et al., 2006; Coffee, 2007) . On this ground, we use resource-based proxies to capture the level of countries' public enforcement intensity from Jackson and Roe (2009) and estimate that the reduction of conflicts of interest in the aftermath of MAD is larger when countries allocate more resources to their financial supervisors. This is true when we consider the budget countries dedicate to financial supervision or the size of the staff working for supervisors. Similarly, we find that affiliated brokers decrease their over-optimistic recommendations much more in countries that rank high on the index of public enforcement intensity developed by La Porta et al. (2006) . Even though the provisions of MAD apply similarly to each European country, our cross-country results suggest that affiliated brokers perceive the effective risk associated with a violation to vary from one country to another, and adjust their behavior accordingly. This paper contributes to the literature in several ways. First, we add to the literature on conflicts of interest of sell-side equity analysts and the impact of legal attempts to mitigate these conflicts. Similar to the outcomes of comparable U.S. regulations, our results highlight that financial analysts reduced their over-optimism regarding investment banking clients after the passage of the European regulation. We emphasize that the observed changes in the behavior of analysts are directly linked to the sanctions and enforcement power that accompany the new rules. As such, our crosscountry analysis suggests that the efficacy of imposing new rules to tackle conflicts of interest rests on the severity of the sanctions imposed in case of violations and the power with which regulators enforce the rules. These results have important implications for the expected outcomes of future regulatory reforms and the efforts to harmonize regulation across countries.
While the idea that legal sanctions and public enforcement affect financial outcomes is not new, the extant evidence has so far remained quite limited. La Porta et al. (2006) , and Jackson and Roe (2009) establish that the strength of public enforcement explains countries' aggregate outcomes such as countries' market capitalization, trading volume, IPO activity, or the aggregate coverage of financial analysts. Bhattacharya and Daouk (2002) provide important microeconomic evidence by showing that firms' cost of capital only decreases after the first enforcement of insider trading regulation. Subsequent papers use the same metric to estimate other microeconomic consequences of enforcement (e.g., Hope, 2003; Bushman et al., 2005) . Our paper brings three novelties to the law and finance literature. First, we show that the strength with which countries enforce their laws has a material impact on the incentives of brokers to produce biased research. Second, we develop a specific index of legal sanctions and show that, like enforcement power, the severity of the legal sanctions that accompany the new European regulation largely matters in explaining regulatory outcomes. Third, because we examine a regulation whose provisions equally apply across several countries, our methodology can precisely isolate the effect of enforcement and sanctions from other effects originated from differences in regulatory rules.
3 Our analysis underscores the need to distinguish between new rules, and their practical enforcement, to properly understand the outcomes of financial regulations.
Finally, we provide new evidence on the functioning of the financial analysis industry in Europe. Existing research has concentrated on studying the U.S. markets (e.g., Barber et al., 2006; Kadan et al., 2009) . We are the first, to the best of our knowledge, to document large-scale evidence on the existence of conflicted equity research due to investment banking ties in Europe. 4 Interestingly, despite substantial differences in markets organization and participation, our analysis underscores that the nature and magnitude of conflicted equity research in Europe appear to be very similar to what has been observed in the U.S.
3 In a contemporaneous and complementary paper, Christensen et al. (2011) examine the impact of MAD and the recent Transparency Directive (TD) on market liquidity and firms' cost of capital.
4 Two other papers suggest the existence of conflicts of interest in Europe. Using around 6,000 stock recommendations, Bessler and Stanzel (2009) report that brokers acting as underwriter in German IPOs issue over-optimistic recommendations.
Using around 8,000 recommendations, Carapeto and Gietzmann (2011) document the presence of conflicted stock recommendation in the U.K.
In the next section, we provide details on the institutional setting of MAD. Section 3 describes the sample and outlines the empirical methodology. Section 4 presents the average impact of MAD on the recommendations of affiliated brokers. Section 5 reports cross-country results highlighting the importance of legal sanctions and enforcement. Section 6 concludes. and estimates, which include forecasts and price targets, must be labeled as such. The methodology used to evaluate financial instruments must also be described. In addition to the time horizon and risk, the date at which the recommendation was released must be prominently indicated. Interestingly, any change in a recommendation that was issued during the last twelve months must be clearly stated.
The Market Abuse Directive
Furthermore, financial institutions providing recommendations are required to disclose every quarter the proportion of "Buy", "Hold" and "Sell" recommendations issued for all stocks they follow.
To limit the pernicious consequences of potential conflicts of interest, the European regulator adopted a pragmatic strategy. To make investors aware of potential conflicts, MAD requires the disclosure of any relevant information that might potentially affect the nature of the recommendation. M&As over the twelve months preceding the recommendation must disclose this information. On this ground, we consider that the relevant jurisdiction is that of the country where the recommended firm is listed. With this definition, when a broker (or its subsidiary) issues a recommendation on a firm that is under the authority of the same regulator, e.g. when Société
Générale (France) issues a recommendation on L'Oréal (France), the general principle of "territoriality" applies. The local (French) supervisor is in charge of investigating the complaint and enforcing MAD's rules. In contrast, when the broker and the firm are not under the supervision of the same national authority, e.g. when an analyst working for Barclays in London (U.K.) issues a recommendation on L'Oréal (France), we retain that the enforcement takes place in the country where 
Data and Methodology

SAMPLE CONSTRUCTION
To identify the presence of potential conflicts of interest and analyze the impact of the new regulation, we look at the nature of analysts' recommendations. We focus specifically on stock recommendations rather than on earnings forecasts because stock recommendations were the focal point of many complaints of conflicts of interest and because conflicted equity research primarily takes place via biased recommendations rather than through biased earnings' forecasts (e.g., Malmendier and Shanthikumar, 2009 12 We eliminate firms if the country of their primary listing is different from the country where they are incorporated. I/B/E/S reports ratings from 1 ("Strong Buy") to 5 ("Strong Sell"). To make the rating system more intuitive, we reverse the scale (5 for "Strong Buy" and 1 for "Strong Sell") so that higher ratings correspond to more favorable recommendations. We further exclude recommendations with missing information on the firm (country or currency codes) or the broker. Kadan et al. (2009) notice that, after 2002, some U.S. brokers adopted a three-tier scale rating system in place of the five-tier scale they used previously. They report an unusual number of recommendations made by these brokers on the days where they switched to the new rating system. As we identify a similar pattern in Europe, we exclude recommendations issued on such days.
13
In line with the provisions of MAD, conflicts of interest originate in the existence of investment business ties between recommended firms and brokers. To identify such ties, we gather information on European IPOs, SEOs, debt issuance and M&As from the Security Data Company's (SDC) database. In particular, we collect the names of book-runners, managers and co-managers, the amount and the date at which transactions took place. We use the I/B/E/S broker name associated with the broker masked code and manually match the names of the book-runner(s), manager(s), comanager(s) and advisor(s) in the SDC database. To complement our classification, we use Nelson Directories to determine which recommendations were issued by independent research firms (with no brokerage business and no investment banking business). We find no recommendations made by such firms in our sample. Finally, to gauge and provide the most accurate evaluation of the European regulation, we define investment business ties by following the exact provisions of MAD. Therefore, any financial institution that issues a recommendation on a firm for which it has acted as an underwriter (SEO, IPO or public debt issuance) or a M&A advisor over the last twelve months is considered as "affiliated" (CD2003/125, article 6, al. 1d). We use this definition to classify each recommendation as Affiliated versus Non-Affiliated.
As a matter of fact, the whole process leading to MAD was first initiated before 2003 by the adoption of codes of ethics at the national and international levels, followed by European Commission 13 We identify thirteen individual brokers that made more than two hundred recommendations on one single day. This happens seventeen times over our sample period. A closer look shows that six of them correspond to those reported in Kadan et al. (2009, Directives and, eventually, by the transposition of these directives into national laws. Since the enforcement of the law is ultimately country-specific, we retain the date at which the corresponding law was enacted in each country. This choice is rather conservative as it makes it more difficult to detect any effect of the regulation.
EMPIRICAL METHODOLOGY
To appraise the impact of MAD on brokers' conflict of interest, we follow Ljungqvist et al. (2007) , and Loh (2009) and examine the effects of brokers' affiliation on their relative recommendation, that is, on the difference between their recommendation and the consensus recommendation. On this ground, we use the following baseline difference-in-differences regression specification:
where the subscripts b, i, c and t represent respectively the broker, the covered firm, the country where the firm is incorporated and the date of the recommendation release. The dependent variable, Optimism b,i,c,t is the recommendation issued by broker b on stock i (of country c) at time t, minus the consensus recommendation across all brokers covering stock i at time t, except broker b. We compute the consensus using the most recent recommendation issued by each broker and exclude recommendations issued more that twelve months prior to the current recommendation. Moreover, we require a minimum of five recommendations to compute a meaningful consensus. As outlined by Ljungqvist et al. (2007) , relative recommendations provide a direct metric to assess whether a broker is optimistic, pessimistic, or neutral compared to peer brokers who issued recommendations on the same stock. Affiliated is a dummy that equals one for recommendations made by brokers classified as affiliated and zero otherwise. Hence, the coefficient γ 0 measures whether affiliated brokers are optimistic (γ 0 > 0) or pessimistic (γ 0 < 0) relative to non-affiliated brokers. If affiliated brokers favor the companies with which they do investment banking business, we expect this coefficient to be positive. The variable MAD c equals one after MAD has been enacted in country c and zero otherwise.
The corresponding coefficient identifies the regulatory shock. To account for broker's heterogeneity, country and time specific effects, we include a set of broker, country, and time fixed effects (α).
Also, in line with empirical studies on stock recommendations, Equation (1) includes variables that control for other potential time-varying determinants of brokers' optimism (X). First, since large institutions may have more resources to support research and may have better access to private information, we control for the size of the broker based on the number of companies followed over the past twelve months preceding the recommendation release (log(#Firms covered)). Then, to capture a stock's information environment, we include the number of brokers who issued at least one recommendation on the stock over the past twelve months preceding the recommendation release (log(#Analysts)). To further capture the potential impact of differential information environments, we also consider whether a recommendation has been issued by another broker in the ten days preceding the recommendation release (Herding) and whether an earnings announcement occurs in the two days before the recommendation (CER). We also include a dummy variable (Initiation) that equals one the first time a broker issues a recommendation on a specific firm and zero otherwise. Finally, to account for the fact that brokers may become optimistic about a stock because it has performed well or because of market-wide optimistic sentiment, we include the stock return (Prior Firm Return) as well as the local market return (Prior Market Return) computed over the twelve months preceding the recommendation (e.g., Jegadeesh et al., 2004; Kadan et al., 2009) . We detail the construction of all the variables in the Appendix. We further adjust estimated standard errors for within-broker error clustering and heteroskedasticity.
The coefficient of interest in Equation (1) is on the interaction between Affiliated and MAD (γ 2 ). To wit, this coefficient measures whether there is a difference between the relative recommendations of affiliated and unaffiliated brokers (first difference) before and after MAD (second difference). As such, if MAD contains provisions that effectively limit the effects of conflicts of interest inherent in investment banking relationships we should observe that affiliated brokers behave more like unaffiliated brokers after the introduction of MAD, corresponding to a reduction of the affiliation bias (γ 2 < 0). Importantly, our identification strategy exploits the staggered implementation of MAD across European countries to precisely isolate the impact of the new regulation on conflicted equity research. Panel B of Table I (Column 2) outlines the dates at which each country implemented MAD. The different timing of the implementation across countries mitigates concerns that marketwide changes, macroeconomic shocks, or other regulatory events confound the impact of MAD on brokers' behavior. Because the translation of the directive (same text) was adopted in different countries in different periods, it also mitigates concerns that often arise about the endogeneity of the regulation and the timing of its adoption (e.g., Ball, 1980; Mulherin, 2007) . Moreover, our set of fixed effects captures any time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity across brokers, countries and periods. Table I reports descriptive statistics for our sample of European stock recommendations.
The Impact of MAD on Conflicts of Interest
UNIVARIATE RESULTS
Overall, the sample covers 261,260 recommendations issued by 224 brokers (pure brokerage houses and investment banks) on 3412 firms. The U.K., Germany, and France account for 65% of the covered firms and 61% of the recommendations. Table I also presents the proportion of recommendations by ratings (Strong Buy, Buy, Neutral, Sell, and Strong Sell). Consistent with Jegadeesh and Kim (2006) , the distribution is right skewed with 18% of "Strong Buy" and 28% of "Buy" recommendations compared to 13% of "Sell" and 5% of "Strong Sell". Notably, the number of firms, brokers and recommendations, seems rather stable over our sample period. A quick comparison with similar U.S.
figures indicates that the distribution of recommendations appears significantly more balanced in Europe. More specifically, "Sell" and "Strong Sell" in the U.S. represent 3% (e.g., Jegadeesh and Kim, 2006) to 6% (e.g., Howe et al., 2009 ) of the recommendations as opposed to 18% in our sample.
[Insert Table I about here] When we specifically focus on affiliated brokers in the pre-MAD period (Table II , Panel A),
we note that the distribution of their recommendations clearly suggests the presence of conflicted research. Indeed, while "Sell" and "Strong Sell" account for 18 of non-affiliated recommendations, they only represent 8% of the recommendations issued by affiliated brokers. Likewise, the proportion of "Buy" and "Strong Buy" is larger for affiliated (58%) than for non-affiliated (46%). We observe a comparable pattern for all years preceding the enactment of MAD. For affiliated brokers, however, the distribution of their recommendations changes after the enactment of MAD. The proportion of "Sell"
and "Strong Sell" recommendations increases to 11%, whereas the proportion of "Buy" and "Strong
Buy" decreases to 51%. We do not see a similar shift for non-affiliated brokers (18/47 for unfavorable/favorable recommendations).
Panel B further breaks down the distribution of recommendations by country. We observe cross-country differences in the fraction of affiliated recommendations. They range between 5% in Austria and 1.5% in Finland. However, no specific country appears to host the bulk of affiliated brokers.
14 Malmendier and Shantikumar (2009) define a brokerage firm as affiliated if it has been a lead or co-underwriter for a firm's IPO in the past five years or for a firm's SEO in the past two years.
MULTIVARIATE RESULTS
We start our regression analysis by examining the average effect of MAD on brokers'
recommendations. Table III Mehran and Stulz, 2007) , strong investment banking ties also generated more aggressive stock recommendations in
Europe during the pre-MAD era. Overall, the control variables display signs that are in line with related studies (e.g., Ljungqvist et al., 2007; Loh, 2009 ).
[Insert Table III about It is also interesting to see that MAD, by itself, had no significant effect on the level of unaffiliated stock recommendations. This results suggests that the observed decrease in the overoptimism of affiliated brokers really comes from the fact that affiliated brokers issue less optimistic recommendations after MAD, and not because unaffiliated brokers became more optimistic. A univariate analysis focusing only on the firms recommended by affiliated brokers largely confirms this fact. Indeed, in the pre-MAD period, the average recommendation of affiliated brokers was 3.78 while the average consensus was 3.56 (the difference of 0.22 reflects the over-optimism bias of affiliated brokers). In the post-MAD period, the average recommendation of affiliated brokers drops to 3.60.
Yet, the average consensus is 3.58 after MAD, which corroborates that our results are driven by the changed behavior of affiliated brokers.
We verify that our results are robust to our definition of Optimism and Affiliation. In columns 2 and 3 of Table III , we modify the definition of the consensus. In column 2, we compute the consensus using recommendations from peers' brokers over the six months that precede a recommendation instead of a year. In column 3, we require at least ten outstanding recommendations in order to compute the consensus. Indeed, one potential concern is that with a small number of outstanding recommendations, the timing of their releases can substantially affect our measure of relative optimism. 15 In column 4 of Table III , we classify as affiliated any recommendation made by a broker on a firm for which it has acted as underwriter or adviser over the last three years. Arguably, investment banking relationships may last longer than a year. Overall, our results are little affected by these modifications.
[Insert Figure regulations on the European Markets (e.g., Hovakimian and Saenyasari, 2010 ). Yet, Figure 1 reveals 15 As an example, assume three brokers with the following recommendations (the subscript identifies the broker): rec 1 = 3, rec 2 = 4 and rec 3 = 5. If they come in this order, then we measure the following optimism: Optimism 2 = 4 -3 = 1 and Optimism 3 = 5 -(4 + 3)/2 = 1.5. However, if broker 3 releases its recommendation just before broker 2, then we obtain the following measure of optimism: Optimism 2 = 4 -(5 + 3)/2 = 0 and Optimism 3 = 5 -3 = 2. Arguably, this concern is lessened when the consensus is obtained with a large number of recommendations.
that the large reduction in the over-optimism of affiliated brokers only materialized after 2004. In the Internet Appendix, we formally verify that our results are not driven by U.S. regulations. In particular, we estimate that affiliated brokers continue to issue over-optimistic recommendations during the interim period going from the adoption of the U.S. regulation to the implementation of MAD.
Moreover, brokers who were part of the Global Settlement continued to favor European companies they advised or underwrote until MAD was enacted.
[Insert Figure 2 about here]
Alternatively, we estimate the average affiliation bias in event-time around each countryspecific enactment. We create a set of event-time dummies where the event year (year 0) represents the enactment of MAD in each country. We consider a window that comprises two years before and respectively two years after MAD. To track the evolution of the affiliation bias around the passage of MAD, we re-estimate Equation (1) but replace MAD by the set of event-time dummies. Figure 2 exhibits the evolution of the affiliation. We observe a slight increase in the affiliation bias (γ 0 goes from 0.267 to 0.335) before the passage of MAD. 16 Nevertheless, we see a massive reduction in the bias after the introduction of MAD (γ 0 goes from 0.335 to 0.066). The observed event-time pattern largely confirms that MAD had a large effect on the over-optimistic recommendations of affiliated brokers.
Taken together, this set of results highlights two notable facts. First, similar to what has been document in the U.S., the European financial analysis industry was indeed plagued by over-optimism biases in the pre-MAD era. Second, the provisions of the European regulation appear to have curbed a large part of the over-optimism of affiliated broker.
In the Internet Appendix we provide additional evidence that support our interpretation as well as the validity of the identification strategy. In particular, we show that the results are robust to various econometric specifications. Also, we show that our results are not sensitive to a change in what we consider the "relevant" jurisdiction. In addition, we provide evidence that the observed over-optimism of affiliated brokers is neither the result of the process through which firms select banks for advisory and underwriting mandates (e.g. firms selecting brokers having the most positive views on their business), nor translating a privileged access to valuable firm-specific information (e.g., Michaely and Womack, 1999) .
Legal Sanctions and Enforcement
Our results so far indicate that the adoption of MAD has significantly reduced the conflicted recommendations of affiliated brokers. Yet, we have treated all European countries as being homogenous and hence have estimated the average effect of MAD on brokers' over-optimism across
Europe. However, due to the lack of legal harmonization in Europe, MAD is not uniformly implemented and enforced across countries. As a result, the disciplining effect associated with MAD could differ from one country to another. To have a clearer picture about the heterogeneity that may exist across European countries, we first examine whether affiliated brokers' over-optimism differs across countries. Figure 3 displays the results of country-by-country specifications. We present the estimated over-optimism bias of affiliated brokers both before (coefficient on Affiliated, represented by the light grey bars) and after MAD (sum of the coefficient on Affiliated and Affiliated×MAD, represented by the dark grey bars).
[Insert Figure 3 about here]
This figure reveals considerable variation across countries, both in the magnitude of the affiliation bias in the pre-MAD era and in the impact of MAD on this bias. For instance, before MAD, affiliated brokers issued largely over-optimistic recommendations on Austrian, British, or Swedish firms but much less when they recommended Belgian, or French firms. Also, the (percentage) reduction of this affiliation bias after MAD appears to vary considerably across countries. It ranges between 50% in Sweden to more than 165% in Belgium, where affiliated brokers became less optimistic than unaffiliated brokers after MAD.
17
In this section we explore whether the observed heterogeneity in the extent of conflicted research and the mitigating impact of MAD is related to 17 We find this pattern in five countries (Belgium, Germany, Finland, Ireland, and Portugal). Yet, the affiliation bias is never significantly negative (at a 10% confidence level).
systematic differences in the severity of the legal sanctions associated with violations of MAD's rules and the strength with which each country enforces the rules.
LEGAL SANCTIONS
We first focus on legal sanctions. Although the rules of MAD apply to all European countries, Member States and national parliaments decide independently on the sanctions that prevail in case of violation of the rules. On this front, we observe substantial differences in administrative and penal sanctions across countries. In practice, these differences imply that analysts communicating biased advices and accused of market manipulation face very different penalties depending on the jurisdiction where they are prosecuted.
We use three variables to capture the disparity in legal sanctions associated with violations of For each article, the CESR report provides information on three distinct types of sanctions: administrative pecuniary sanctions, criminal sanctions (imprisonment), and criminal sanctions (fines and other measures). Using this source, for each country 18 The remaining articles are targeting primary insiders or are not subject to sanctions.
19 Note that we have also developed a similar "sanction severity index" by focusing only on the sanction related to Article 6.5.
The results are unchanged.
and each of the four above mentioned articles, we gather the maximum hypothetical sanction that would prevail in case of a violation. [Insert Table IV about here] Then, for each country, we compute the average rank for pecuniary administrative sanctions.
We re-iterate this procedure for both criminal sanctions and fines. Next, we sum these three rankings to obtain an aggregate index that we use to assign a rank to each country (sanctions rank). When information is not available, it is replaced by the sanction incurred for violation of the remaining articles within the same class of sanctions. With this procedure, the index of sanction severity provides a consistent hierarchy of the severity with which each country penalizes violations of MAD's provisions. Table V reveals that the U.K., Spain, and Italy appear to have strong sanctions. In contrast, the Scandinavian countries turn out to rely on mild levels of legal sanctions and, more importantly, to rely on classic courts (as opposed to regulators).
[Insert Table V about Using these three sanction-related measures, we assess whether the strictness of legal sanctions affect the change in brokers' behavior around the adoption of MAD. Specifically, we estimate our baseline (difference-in-differences) Equation (1) separately across two groups of countries based on their associated sanctions. We assign a country in the "Weak" ("Strong") group if its index of Supervisory Power, Sanction Severity or Sanctions LLS is below the sample median. By estimating such a triple-differences model, we gauge whether the degree of legal sanctions affects the over-optimism of affiliated brokers, and whether the effect of MAD on brokers' behavior varies with the associated legal sanctions. To compare coefficients across the two groups, we estimate a Seemingly Unrelated Regression (SUR) system that combines the "Weak" and "Strong" groups. The SUR estimation provides the joint variance-covariance matrix that we use to compare cross-equation coefficients.
[Insert Table VI about here] Table VI reports the results across the "Weak" and "Strong" countries. With all three proxies for legal sanctions, we observe no difference in the over-optimism bias of affiliated brokers between country groups in the pre-MAD period. F-tests reveal that the coefficients on Affiliated are not statistically different between the "Weak" and "Strong" partitions. Furthermore, we find that the adoption of MAD reduces the over-optimism bias of affiliated brokers both in "Weak" and "Strong" countries. However, the magnitude of this reduction differs across partitions. Notably, the disciplining impact of MAD appears much larger in countries that accompany the passage of MAD with strong legal sanctions. Our estimations indicate that the coefficients on Affiliated×MAD range between -0.157 and -0.170 in "Weak" countries. In contrast, they are comprised between to -0.248 and -0.275 in "Strong" countries. In terms of economic magnitude, the observed differences are nonnegligible. Across all measures of sanction severity, our estimates suggest that MAD essentially eliminates the over-optimism bias of affiliated brokers in countries equipped with strong legal sanctions. In countries where legal sanctions are weaker, the adoption of MAD triggers a reduction of the affiliation bias of ranging between 65% and 73%. 20 Overall, the results in Table VI support the idea that the behavior of affiliated brokers is significantly affected by the severity of the potential sanctions they face. In the context of MAD, the specific legal sanctions established by Member States appear to play a role in explaining the behavior of conflicted brokers around the adoption of the European Directive.
ENFORCEMENT
Besides differences in legal sanctions, the enforcement of MAD's provisions also varies across countries (e.g. Enriques and Gatti, 2008) . Indeed, while the rules of MAD prevail in all EC countries, their enforcement is left to national authorities. Recent research in law and finance suggests that the intensity of enforcement effort by securities regulators is of paramount importance to understand the effectiveness of regulatory changes. In particular, La Porta et al. (2006), Coffee (2007) , or Jackson and Roe (2009) highlight that strong enforcement of legal rules propels financial market development. Also, Bushman et al. (2005) and Hope (2003) show that enforcement intensity generally improve the production of financial analysts. On this ground, we examine whether the strength of enforcement at the country level also affects the impact of MAD on the behavior of affiliated brokers.
While the idea that enforcement plays an important role in shaping regulations' success, measuring enforcement intensity is a difficult task. Researchers have taken different roads to capture level of enforcement of securities regulations. Then, to gauge how the intensity of public enforcement is related to the impact of MAD, we split countries into "Weak" and "Strong" enforcement based on the median value of each enforcement measure (Staff, Budget and Enforcement LLS) use again a triple-differences approach. Importantly, because the provisions of MAD are held constant across countries, our triple-difference estimation enables us to cleanly isolate the effect of public enforcement on brokers' behavior from other effects coming from cross-country differences in regulatory provisions. The results reported in Table VII reveal several interesting findings. First, we note that the coefficient on Affiliated appears slightly larger in countries characterized by low enforcement intensity. Yet the difference is not significant at conventional levels (p-values of 0.31 and 0.14 for the Staff and Budget measures) affiliated brokers appear to be more over-optimistic in these countries during the pre-MAD era. Second, across the three measures of public enforcement, the effect of MAD on affiliated brokers' optimism is markedly larger in countries characterized by strong enforcement power. Similarly to the effect of legal sanctions, we 22 To the best of our knowledge, no broker was sued because of violation of MAD provisions over our sample period.
Therefore, we do not rely on enforcement outputs.
observe that the over-optimism bias virtually vanishes after MAD in countries that enforce laws vigorously. On the contrary, while significant, MAD only triggers a partial reduction of the affiliation bias in countries where public enforcement is weaker. In line with Coffee (2007) and Jackson and Roe (2009) , our results confirm that public enforcement matters. In our context, it matters by limiting conflicted equity research subsequently to the adoption of MAD.
[Insert Table VII about here] All in all, our analysis indicates that the strength with which countries enforce their laws and, to a lesser extent, the severity of the legal sanctions play a key role in understanding how affiliated brokers reacted to MAD. While Hope (2003) and Bushman et al. (2005) underscore that the vigor of legal enforcement affects analysts' coverage intensity and accuracy, we show that strong sanctions and enforcement impact the behavior of conflicted brokers. A key distinction with the above papers is that we focus on a single law that is common to all European countries. Interestingly, even though our results are limited to a specific law that applies to thirteen European countries, they suggest that, without an effort to harmonize the legal sanctions and enforcement procedures across countries, the effectiveness of European regulations may well be country dependent. On this front, our results confirm the conclusions of Christensen et al. (2011) , who document that country-level enforcement is a key element that explains the positive effect of MAD and the recent European Transparency
Directive on the liquidity of European stocks.
Conclusion
We use the recent implementation of the Market Abuse Directive (MAD) in Europe to examine the interplay between securities regulation and the behavior of conflicted brokers. Our analysis highlights several notable results. First, we establish the presence of conflicted equity research in Europe during the pre-MAD era: Brokers issued significantly more favorable recommendations on firms with which they entertained investment banking relationship. Second, we find that the passage of MAD significantly reduced this practice. Third, using the heterogeneity that exists in legal sanctions and enforcement practices across European countries, we find that the curbing effect of MAD largely depends on countries' institutional traits. The impact of MAD is significantly stronger in countries where the sanctions applicable in cases of violations of MAD's rules are severe.
Also, our results highlight that the reduction of conflicts of interest is more pronounced in countries that strictly enforce their laws.
In a nutshell, the main message of this paper is that legal sanctions and enforcement mechanisms are important elements affecting the extent of conflicts of interest that arise when brokers issue recommendations on their investment banking clients. Our findings point to interesting avenues for further research, two of which we outline here. First, we uncover that the behavior of financial States, we hope to see more research on these and related questions. 
Appendix: Definition of and source of the variables
IBES
Sanction severity
The thirteen countries are ranked based on their respective administrative pecuniary penalties, criminal sanctions and fines (articles 4, 6.3, 6.5 and 14.3) . For each country, the average rank for the three sorts of sanctions is the sanction severity index. (1)). The unit of analysis is a stock recommendation. The dependent variable, Optimism, is a metric that assesses the optimism of broker b, at time t, compared to peer brokers who issued a recommendation on the same stock during the same period. MAD is a dummy variable that equals 1 after the transposition of MAD into national laws and 0 before. In column (1) we estimate our baseline specification corresponding to Equation (1). In column (2), we modify the measure of optimism by computing the consensus using recommendations from peers' brokers over the six months that precede the recommendation (instead of one year). In column (3), we modify the measure of optimism by requiring at least ten outstanding recommendations to compute a consensus. In column (4) we extend our definition of affiliation by considering as affiliated those recommendations issued by a broker that had investment banking business with the recommended firm over the three years that precede the recommendation (instead of one year). All estimations include broker fixed effects, country fixed effects, and year fixed effects. All the variables are defined in the Appendix. The sample period is 1997 to 2007. The estimations correct for heteroskedasticity and within-broker error clustering. We report t statistics in brackets. ** and * denote statistical significance at the 1 and 5 level, respectively. The last row presents the p-value of a test corresponding to: γ 0 (coefficient on Affiliated) + γ 2 (coefficient on Affiliated×MAD) = 0. This table presents results of regressions examining whether the impact of MAD on brokers' over-optimism (Equation (1)) depends on legal sanctions. The unit of analysis is a stock recommendation. The dependent variable, Optimism, is a metric that assesses the optimism of broker b, at time t, compared to peer brokers who issued a recommendation on stock i. Affiliated is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the issuing broker had investment banking business with the recommended firm during the preceding year. MAD is a dummy variable that equals 1 after the transposition of MAD into national laws and 0 before. We partition countries based on three proxies for the severity of legal sanctions. In columns (1) and (2), we partition the sample based on the index of sanction severity defined in Section 5.1. In columns (3) and (4), we partition the sample based on the index of supervisory power as defined in the 2007 report of the CESR. In columns (5) and (6), we partition the sample based on the index of criminal sanction developed by La Porta et al. (2006) . For each variable, we assign a country into the "Weak" group if it has value below the sample median and in the "Strong" group if it has value above the sample median. We estimate Equation (1) via a Seemingly Unrelated Regression (SUR) system that combines the "Weak" and "Strong" groups. The SUR estimation provides the joint variance-covariance matrix that we use to construct tests to compare cross-equation restrictions. To preserve space, we do not report the coefficients of the control variables (whose definitions can be found in the Appendix). The sample period spans from 1997 to 2007. All estimations include broker fixed effects, country fixed effects, and year fixed effects. The estimations correct for heteroskedasticity and within-broker error clustering. We report t statistics in brackets. ** and * denote statistical significance at the 1 and 5 level, respectively. This table presents results of regressions examining whether the impact of MAD on brokers' over-optimism (Equation (1)) depends on the strength of public enforcement. The unit of analysis is a stock recommendation. The dependent variable, Optimism, is a metric that assesses the optimism of broker b, at time t, compared to peer brokers who issued a recommendation on stock i. Affiliated is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the issuing broker had investment banking business with the recommended firm during the preceding year. MAD is a dummy variable that equals 1 after the transposition of MAD into national laws and 0 before. We partition countries based on three proxies for the severity of legal sanctions. In columns (1) and (2), we partition the sample based on the staffing of financial supervisors (from Jackson and Roe (2009) ). In columns (3) and (4), we partition the sample based on budget of financial supervisors (from Jackson and Roe (2009) ). In columns (5) and (6), we partition the sample based on the index of public enforcement developed by La Porta et al. (2006) . For each variable, we assign a country into the "Weak" group if it has value below the sample median and in the "Strong" group if it has value above the sample median. We estimate Equation (1) via a Seemingly Unrelated Regression (SUR) system that combines the "Weak" and "Strong" groups. The SUR estimation provides the joint variance-covariance matrix that we use to construct tests to compare cross-equation restrictions. To preserve space, we do not report the coefficients of the control variables (whose definitions can be found in the Appendix). The sample period spans from 1997 to 2007. All estimations include broker fixed effects, country fixed effects, and year fixed effects. The estimations correct for heteroskedasticity and within-broker error clustering. We report t statistics in brackets. ** and * denote statistical significance at the 1 and 5 level, respectively. 
